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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the worldwide financial crisis, many policymakers and economists are looking at 
how best to stabilize housing markets. One option is to introduce automatic stabilizers in the form of 
housing taxation where it does not exist and revise it where it does. Intriguingly, such a tax can have 
several dividends. First, it can help stabilize economic development since it can be fashioned to work 
counter-cyclically and dampen highly pro-cyclical housing consumption; see e.g. Leung (2004); Davis 
and Heathcote (2005); Jud and Winkler (2002); and Leamer (2007). In fact, the governor of Norway’s 
central bank has recently argued the benefits of housing taxation on exactly these grounds.1  This is 
firstly because, he explains, the favorable tax treatment could make housing assets more attractive than 
other assets, and because the central bank’s only tool, the interest rate, cannot be used to target 
inflation, limit interest-rate differentials to other currencies, and function as a housing market 
stabilizer at one and the same time. Second, a revenue-neutral substitution of a housing tax for an 
income tax could reduce deadweight losses; see simulations on general-equilibrium models by 
Nakagami and Pereira (1996) and Bye and Åvitsland (2003). Third, since the demand for housing may 
have relatively stable and monotone Engel curves, a properly designed housing tax could be 
constructed to function progressively. The latter point is important since a proposal of a new and 
regressive tax would be dead on arrival in many economies and where they do exist the flat-rate 
property taxes and the small scale housing taxation most likely work regressively; see Hendershott and 
White’s (2000) survey. The design of such taxes and whom they affect and how may explain their 
unpopularity.  On the other hand, there is an urgent need to reform the tax given recent concerns about 
housing inequity (Thalmann (2007)) and since many authors have pointed towards the regressive 
nature of the interest subsidy (Poterba (1992)), the preferential treatment of owner-occupied housing 
(Cremer and Gahvari (1998)), and the favorable treatment of housing overall (see Hendershott and 
White (2000)). This article seeks to define the core elements of an implementation procedure of 
housing taxation and how existing housing taxation could be practically revised to become cheaper, 
quicker, and progressive. 
 
This article partitions the procedure in five key stages: identification; estimation; data acquisition and 
combination; empirical investigation; and tax function construction. None are trivial. Consider first the 
concept of housing. Designing a tax system implies a classification of the tax object. A house may 
generate rental income, it is a capital asset, and it facilitates the consumption of housing services. 
                                                     
1 See story in Aftenposten, October 1 2009, economy section, pp. 1 and 4. For an English version of the governor’s 
September 30 speech, use the internet permalink: http://www.norges-bank.no/templates/article____75542.aspx. 
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Thus, since a tax system can levy an income tax, a wealth tax, a property tax, or a consumption tax on 
the house-owner the tax designer must be careful to specify and analyze the tax base. Second, owner-
occupiers receive no observable rental income, they own assets of unknown market value, and they 
extract consumption services of unobserved magnitude. Thus, a tax designer has to construct an 
estimation procedure. Third, for an empirically based data driven tax design a statistical agency must 
acquire and update data on a continuous basis. Fourth, the distribution of taxes is a political issue and a 
sensitive question of equity. Thus, a designer would be well advised to anticipate who will bear the 
burden of a housing tax. This involves mapping housing consumption along the spectrum of material 
standard of living. Fifth, since the opposition towards new taxes plausibly depends upon the 
progressivity of the system, the designer might benefit from contemplating certain basic attributes of 
tax functions. I suggest four. 
 
This article presents theoretical and empirical results of implementing a housing tax in a certain way. I 
call it the “consumption method” because levies are computed directly on the basis of estimated 
housing consumption in contrast to indirect methods of taxing housing ownership which involve 
adding imputed housing income to labor income, adding estimated housing wealth to financial wealth, 
or levying a property tax. There are two principal advantages to this approach. It allows one to employ 
conventional methodology, i.e. the rental-equivalence principle; and the method is transparent. 
Moreover, since the estimation technique it employs relies on an algorithm derived from a 
combination of data bases rather than manual appraisals, it is cheaper, quicker, and less subjective.  
Having said, that the consumption method also involves the introduction of a new tax, unlike 
implementing a house tax through the utilization of income or wealth taxes. 
 
My contribution is threefold. First, I attempt to demonstrate the sufficiency of the suggested procedure 
from data acquisition to policy introduction. Second, I construct an estimator of latent housing 
consumption based on the combination of observed rents and rental attributes with attributes of owner-
occupied housing to impute counter-factual rents using a rental-equivalence principle that goes back at 
least to Aaron (1970). Third, I construct a progressive tax function and show that it would satisfy four 
progressivity principles on real and recent data from Norway in 2006.  
 
The results could help policymakers since they spell out how a housing tax can be implemented in 
economies that do not have one. In fact, many countries appear to be contemplating such a tax, not 
least because the recent rise and fall in house prices may have amplified the business cycle and 
destabilized the banking sector and overall economy. In countries with a housing tax based on 
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appraisals, for example the Netherlands (see de Vries et al. (2009), this article’s set-up offers a 
potentially much less resource-demanding and time-consuming way of maintaining the system of 
house price estimates. As a matter of revenue generation, my proposal would generate tax revenues of 
the order of NOK 12 billion, which would warrant sizable income tax reductions, and hence lower 
deadweight losses. For an economy whose gross domestic product (GDP) is NOK 2,160 billion, it 
might, however, appear somewhat insubstantial since the housing tax revenue is just a little more than 
half a percent of GDP. But the revenue can easily be increased by changing the scale of the levy. 
 
In summary, this article combines an understanding of the construction of house price indices, results 
from tax theory, and empirical techniques from the literature on Engel curves. I hesitate to offer even a 
basic review of these expansive fields of knowledge. Let me instead briefly sketch the contours of 
some useful studies at the point of convergence between taxes and distribution and housing and taxes. 
A useful starting point is Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), according to whom “tax structures must be 
centrally concerned with distributional considerations” (page 55). They found no role for commodity 
taxes: “the optimal tax system can rely solely on income taxation”. However, the result depends 
crucially on homogeneity of preferences. Besides, income is not limited to labor and capital income 
but should comprise the latent income stream from an asset such as a house. Christiansen (1984) found 
conditions when goods that are complementary to leisure should be taxed, and finds that commodity 
taxation, under heterogeneous tastes and non-linear taxation, is warranted if it is positively related to 
leisure. This result led to intense scrutiny of commodity taxation. But authors never took their eyes off 
distributive issues, even if it is as complicated as Okun (1975) describes when he likened 
redistribution to transferring water from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket. Slemrod (1994) 
addressed the issues underlying that leak, suggesting there exists an optimal rate of leakage. The 
optimal rate is an empirical entity and closely related both to actual behavior and to the multiplicity of 
instruments for tax revenue generation. So, it may be argued that policymakers would be well advised 
to study theoretical studies in tandem with empirical investigations. Recently, Slemrod and Kopczuk 
(2002) examined behavioral responses to tax regimes. This article joins the debate on distribution by 
showing how a housing tax can attain distributional aims while being simple, and potentially include 
stabilization and efficiency goals. 
 
Given that preference heterogeneity allows commodity taxation, and given that actual behavior should 
be taken into account when constructing tax system, housing is an obvious target. After all, it is 
difficult for individuals to avoid taxation of housing because of its durability and immobility (Leung 
(2004, p. 252). We might add observability. Hendershott and White (2000) survey the shifts in the 
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status of housing taxation and subsidization from the 1970s and explain how and why housing taxation 
is set up the way it is. In a valuable contribution, Gervais (2002) studies the impact of preferential tax 
treatment of housing using a dynamic general equilibrium life-cycle economy and finds in his 
simulations that individuals would prefer, at all income levels, to live in economies that tax imputed 
rents or do not let taxpayers deduct mortgage interest payments. This followed the earlier study of 
Nakagami and Pereira (1996) who use a dynamic general equilibrium model to show how removing 
interest deductibility and imputed rent exemption would affect both the budget and efficiency. It 
would boost revenues and improve allocation efficiency, they found. Cremer and Gahvari (1998) 
examine the question of optimal taxation of housing, and note that the recent literature has raised the 
possibility of substantial efficiency loss by the preferential treatment of owner-occupied housing. They 
point out how, under certain conditions, housing for the poor can be subsidized and how optimal taxes 
must be non-linear, both results being consistent with my findings in this article. Leung (2004) surveys 
the new and emerging literature on the link between macro and housing and asks pertinently why, 
given the apparent consensus among economists, is it that preferential treatment of housing is 
undesirable, and why was it implemented in the first place. Unable to give exhaustive answers, he 
points to the assumed positive externalities and social benefits of homeownership, governmental 
myopia and time-inconsistency as likely possibilities. It is a timely question, and this article calls for a 
renewed effort to overhaul the housing tax system and suggests how this could be accomplished. 
 
The article is organized as follows. The next section discusses the different bases for housing taxation 
and the subsequent section introduces theory and empirical techniques of estimating latent housing 
consumption. The fourth section describes the acquisition and combination of required datasets. The 
fifth section presents empirical results on estimates of housing consumption and their distribution. In 
section 6, I design the proper housing tax system before discussing in the seventh section the 
advantages and disadvantages of the approach and investigating some of the alternatives. The final 
part is dedicated to concluding remarks and likely policy implications. The appendix contains some of 
the finer details and robustness checks on regressions on earlier datasets and other variables. 
2. Stage One: Identification of the Housing Tax Base 
This article suggests that the direct way to housing taxation may be the most politically feasible: levy 
house taxes directly on housing consumption. However, housing consumption can be measured in 
several ways. It may be seen as foregone rent − which is the basis for the rental-equivalence principle 
− or it can be derived as the component of housing expenditures that does not change household 
equity. Using the latter approach, payments on principal are not a component of housing consumption, 
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they are classified as re-allocation of equity. However, manifest interest payments on mortgages are 
one, though not the only component of interest costs. Latent, implicit interests on own equity comprise 
the remainder. Thus, interest may be viewed as either the hypothetical interest payments paid on the 
mortgage that would have financed a purchase of a given home in the market at a given point in time, 
where the household has no equity. Alternatively, interest could be defined as the counter-factual 
shadow return on a full conversion from selling a home and placing the receipts in a fixed-income 
security. Both of these interest aggregates (outlays or income) can be estimated using a hedonic house 
price index that imputes a home’s market value from the attributes of the home and using mean long-
term market interest rates. 
 
The direct taxation of housing consumption, whether based on the rental-equivalence principle of 
imputing rent or the interest-accrued approach, could be difficult to implement politically because of 
obstacles within the existing tax code. And policymakers might stall at the idea of introducing yet 
another type of tax object.  
 
Policymakers, then, could require houses to be taxed in the same way as shares or savings deposits, 
that is, by levying a tax on what would be just another asset. It would be necessary, of course, in order 
to levy a wealth tax to assess  the value of any and every house deemed to belong to the tax base, and 
the assessment would have to be undertaken frequently in order to avoid over- or undervaluation. The 
assessment scheme could become quite a drain on resources; see De Vries et al. (2009) for more on 
such schemes.  
 
Another option is to classify housing consumption of owner-occupiers as implicit income, adding this 
income to a household’s labor income in the same manner as financial income is. It could be argued 
that a first-best solution is simply to view a house as a capital asset and tax it as an asset exactly the 
same way other assets are taxed: housing income by capital income taxes and housing wealth by 
wealth taxes. The capital asset approach is consistent with this article’s set-up since such a tax base 
could be identified in stage one and such a tax scheme could be constructed in stage five. However, 
the capital asset approach faces practical and political challenges. First, the housing dividend is not 
manifest as other dividends. It would have to be estimated, e.g. by way of employing this article’s 
imputed rent estimator. Second, the political opposition to treating a necessary consumption good, 
housing, identically to capital assets such as stocks and bonds would be formidable. Since many 
countries have a flat-rate tax on capital income a distributional analysis would demonstrate that a 
similar flat-rate tax on a necessary consumption good would function regressively. So, although 
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transparent and logical, the drawback is that “housing income” could be considered “a special” income 
source by politicians and have to be distinguished from labor and financial income. If not, households 
whose income was largely derived from “housing income” would face a dramatic increase in tax 
levies, creating its own political headaches. Instances in which housing taxes exceeded labor income 
and pensions would obviously attract a lot of publicity and political and public resistance. In Stage 
Five, I suggest a scheme based on postponed taxes to deal with this objection. 
 
Policymakers could possibly prefer a housing taxation scheme that satisfies the following conditions: 
a) its purpose and function can be explained in a comprehensible way; b) it allows for a timely 
updating of level of levy; c) it can utilize databases and an algorithm platform instead of physical 
assessment by subjective appraisers; and d) it allows but does not rely on an ability to 
isolate/differentiate income sources such as labor income.  All these conditions are satisfied if we use  
“imputed rent” as an estimator of housing consumption, as indeed the rental-equivalence principle 
states. It is easy to explain and the public understands it intuitively. Levies can be changed every year, 
computed on the basis of two datasets, namely rental data on the association between rents and 
hedonic attributes and spatial coordinates, and owner data on hedonic attributes and spatial 
coordinates. The method also allows for tax codes that differentiate it from labor income. This article 
demonstrates one efficient mode of implementation. 
3. Stage Two: Estimation Theory and Empirical Technique 
The second stage involves three sub-stages: an analysis of when a tax is regressive and progressive, 
the establishment of an estimation procedure for housing consumption, and the empirical technique to 
be used when investigating the distribution of housing and housing tax. I present below a detailed 
account of all three.  
 
If a tax t is put on manifest housing expenditures in household h, yh, then the housing tax tyh involves 
paying in taxes a share h h hty xθ =  of manifest total expenditures, xh. Let ωh be the budget share of 
housing expenditures for household h. Equation (1) represents the relationship between the tax share 
and the budget share: 
(1) ,hh h
h
ty t
x
θ ω= =  
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where the tax share θh is a linear function of the budget share ωh when t is a constant. Since the budget 
share varies across households, then when t is a constant the tax share paid by household h is a 
function of both housing expenditures and total expenditures, ( ),h h ht y xθ ω= , where ω here is a 
general function that maps housing expenditures and total expenditures into a budget share. If the 
relationship between housing expenditures yh and total expenditures xh is stable for all h, so that y 
simply is a function of x for all households, i.e. y(x), the function ( ),h hy xω  can be simplified to a 
function only of total expenditures, ω(x). If so, and if this function is decreasing (increasing) in x, i.e. 
0( 0)xδω δ < > , the housing tax share of total expenditures is decreasing (increasing) with total 
expenditures since ( ) 0( 0)x t xδθ δ δω δ= < > . Such a tax, it follows, is therefore regressive 
(progressive). If indeed it is regressive, it can be turned into a progressive tax by policymakers 
constructing an appropriate tax scheme t(x) as a non-linear function of x such that the tax share of total 
expenditures increases with x, as given by equation (2): 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0.x t x xx t x
x x x
θ ω
ω
∂ ∂ ∂
= + >
∂ ∂ ∂
 
Equation (2) holds when the tax is progressive, i.e. it holds if the tax progression in the first 
component is sufficiently large to dominate in absolute terms the possibly falling budget share in the 
second component. As this simple and straightforward exercise demonstrates, empirical estimates of 
consumer behavior could be of considerable interest to policymakers, since t(x) is within their 
discretion to implement as policy while ω(x) is an empirical Engel function to be estimated from data 
on consumer behavior.  
 
In order to examine the relationship between housing expenditures and total expenditures (or income) 
and establish empirical regularities, several obstacles must be overcome. First, the definition of what 
counts as housing consumption is non-trivial and controversial. Employing manifest housing 
expenditures as estimates of latent housing consumption requires several tenuous assumptions and 
contains multiple sources of errors. Second, the measurement of total expenditures is non-trivial. 
Third, the choice of functional form and how to control for important omitted variables are non-
obvious.  
 
I define housing consumption to be a quantity and housing consumption expenditure to be that 
quantity multiplied by its price. I deal with the first challenge by using the rental-equivalence principle 
to employ imputed rent as an estimator of latent housing consumption expenditure. Now, even if 
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manifest housing expenditures are directly observable as entries in diaries kept in connection with 
Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES), they are rendered inadequate by heterogeneity in the 
completion of the amortization of the principal. Latent housing consumption expenditure as a variable 
consists of the unobservable quantity of consumption and a theoretical price. This price depends on the 
unobservable value of the home. Some households have completed the amortization of the mortgage 
and have full equity. They do not pay interest, but they still enjoy a latent stream of housing services 
with a latent value. Other households have partially completed the amortization and have non-zero 
equity. However, the latent stream of housing services has a latent value that differs from the interest 
payments. Thus, I estimate the value of this consumption, i.e. the owner-occupied housing 
consumption expenditure, by identifying the housing consumption value as foregone rent. 
 
This article uses imputed rent as an estimator of latent housing consumption expenditure. The 
estimation involves a two-step procedure. First, the statistical agency collects observations from rental 
markets on vectors containing market rent, hedonic attributes, spatial coordinates and other 
determinants. It regresses observed rent, R, onto the relevant space spanned by rent determinants and 
obtains the partial rental price for each hedonic and spatial housing components, as given in equation 
(3): 
(3) , ,te te te te RteR k hH sS oO u te TE= + + + + ∈  
where R is observed rent for tenant te in the tenant sample TE, and H, S, and O are hedonic attributes, 
spatial coordinates, and other determinants of the object the tenant rents. Second, the statistical agency 
conducts consumer expenditure surveys to collect vectors of such housing components from owner-
occupier households, and estimates what the households would have paid in rent had they rented their 
own home. To this end, imputed rent functions as an estimator of latent housing consumption 
expenditure for owner-occupiers, as given in equation (4): 
(4) ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ ,ih h h h hy R k hH sS oO= = + + +  
where i is the housing category among consumption categories; the estimated parameters k, h, s, and o 
are used in combination with the hedonic attributes, spatial coordinates, and other determinants of the 
housing object owned by the owner-occupier h to compute the estimate on latent housing consumption 
expenditure for the owner-occupier h. 
 
Having established an estimator of housing consumption expenditure, I turn to the technique with 
which to examine the distribution. Then, I deal first with the second and third challenges mentioned 
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above by substituting gross income for total expenditures and employing both parametric and non-
parametric techniques. To see why, consider the following rationale. In general, we would like to 
inspect the empirical relationship between latent consumption expenditure in household h on category 
i, ηih, and latent total consumption expenditure in household h, ξh, by examining their observable 
counterparts, i.e. expenditures in category i, yih, and total expenditures, xh. Equation (5) establishes the 
relationship between these two empirical counterparts.  
(5) ( ) .ih h ihy f x u= +  
Manifest total expenditure xh is the sum of latent total consumption expenditure and all measurement 
errors in individual categories, h ihi uξ + . Thus, the regressor manifest total expenditure, xh, contains 
(as part of the sum of measurement errors from each category) an element identical to the error term 
uih in equation (5). In other words, the regressor xh is not exogenous. This could have been dealt with 
by running two-stage-least-square (2SLS) regressions and modeling total expenditure as endogenous, 
and using income as an exogenous instrument. However, the linear 2SLS-models cannot do justice to 
curvature, and much literature focuses attention on the non-linearity of Engel curves; see Banks et al. 
(1997) for non-linearity, Blundell et al. (2003) for non-parametric ones, and Lewbel (1998) for semi-
parametric ones. On the other hand, attempting to model the relationship between housing 
consumption expenditure and total consumption expenditure non-linearly with instruments, and yet 
retain certain estimator properties, is non-trivial. Thus, in order to examine curvature in a tractable and 
transparent fashion I avoid the endogenous variable total expenditures and use instead the exogenous 
variable gross income. Equation (6) presents the parsimonious parametric model of the relationship 
between the proportion of estimated housing consumption expenditure (imputed rent) out of gross 
income and gross income itself. 
(6) ( ) ( )( )2ˆ log log ,ih h h h ih
h
y a b GI c GI dD e
GI
= + + + +  
where GI  refers to gross income, D to a vector of demographic controls for household size, 
composition and age of main income earner, and subscript h refers to a household h in the cross-
sectional sample. The error term eih is assumed to be a classical and well-behaved stochastic variable 
with mean-zero and constant variance. 
 
The omitted-variable problem constitutes a challenge. There will almost always be a risk that models 
will miss some important factor, without the analyst knowing which variables are left out or how they 
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influence the regressions. This entails possible biases in the parameter estimates. In demand and Engel 
curve estimation certain shift parameters are, however, known ex ante or in the literature to be of 
importance. One such factor is the vector of key demographic variables, e.g. size and composition of 
the household, and life-cycle stage indicators, e.g. age of main income earner. Obviously, a large 
household needs a larger house than a small one, everything else being the same. Thus, I use the 
number of children and the number of adults in the household as shift parameters of the curves. 
Moreover, a young household is likely to have different housing needs than an older one, everything 
else being the same, so I include age as a preference shifter. 
 
Another core variable is relative price. It is conventional in cross-sectional analyses to assume that 
consumers face the same relative prices at a given point in time. While this may be an innocuous 
assumption for many demand and Engel curves, it may not be so for housing. Some would argue that 
relative housing prices cannot be identical to all households at the same time since prices do vary 
across regions for a given set of hedonic attributes, e.g. size. This, however, is not necessarily a valid 
objection. Its relevance depends crucially on whether confounding is present or not. The partial price 
for a given hedonic attribute, such as size, is mis-measured if one fails to control for a correlated 
determinant, such as quality of location. In fact, it is easy to explain most of the different prices across 
regions for hedonic attributes when controlling for spatial qualities and amenities.  
 
Functional form is contentious in the literature on Engel and income curves. I therefore supplement the 
parametric approach with a non-parametric technique to map the relationship between the share of 
imputed rent and income. A local regression technique then estimates the Engel (or income) curves. 
Since gross income is exogenous, it is a useful determinant in the non-parametric estimation process. I 
start my non-parametric estimation procedure by noting how the relationship between the housing 
share of income before tax and income before tax is given by equation (7): 
(7) ( ), ˆ , ,ihhou h h h h
h
y g GI D
GI
ω μ= = +  
in which g(.) is an unspecified function, potentially non-monotonous, and the classically behaved error 
term μ is uncorrelated with gross income, GI. As before, D denotes demographic variables such as size 
and composition, and ωhou now refers to housing's share of income before tax, GI. The local regression 
method fits a linear weighted regression line in a local neighborhood for each GIh.2 The linear 
                                                     
2 The neighborhood is chosen so as to contain a percentage of all available observations in the sample. These observations are 
weighted by a smooth, decreasing function of their distance for each center I,h. 
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regression weight assigned to an included observation GIi around GIh, for which the local line is fit, is 
given by equation (8): 
(8) ( ) 0 0, , ( ) , , , ,i hi h i
i
GI GIW GI GI b K x K i I h H x X
b
 −
= = ∈ ∈ ∈  
 
where GIi is member of the bandwidth set around GIh such that the set that contains the observations 
used in the local regression I is a subset of H. The width variable bi specifies the range of bandwidth, 
and K0(x) is a smooth weighting function. The variable x is an intermediary variable and element in the 
real-number set X. This article uses the Tri-Cube function for K0(x): 
(9) ( )330 1 , for 1,( ) .
0, otherwise
x xK x
 
− ≤ 
=    
 
4. Stage Three: Data Acquisition and Combination 
In order to estimate latent housing consumption expenditure by employing the rental-equivalence 
principle, one needs rental data to obtain partial rental prices for housing attributes and consumer data 
to obtain housing attributes for owners. To this end, I combine data on consumer expenditures, 
imputed rents implied from a rental survey, and income acquired by Statistics Norway for the period 
2004−06. In order to investigate sensitivity and robustness, I perform cross-checks on earlier data from 
2000−03 and report some, but not all, results in the Appendix. 
4a. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) and Income Data 
Statistics Norway contact 1/26 of their household sample every two weeks and ask households to keep 
a diary of all expenditures over a fortnight. These households are subsequently interviewed for 
demographic variables, housing arrangements and attributes, and other variables of interest. The CES 
data set includes household size and composition, age of household members, region of residence, 
vocation of main income earner, number of hours worked for main income earner, and ownership of a 
number of household durables such as cars, boats, refrigerators, washing machines, cooking stoves, 
television sets, video recorders, and microwave ovens. Sample sizes are typically around 1,000−1,200 
households per year. The sampling scheme is a two-stage stratified random sample of the universe of 
Norwegian households. Response rates typically lie around 60 percent. The expenditures are classified 
into a large array of different items. Official data managers code from the entries in the households’ 
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accounting books and slot them into pre-assigned groups. Expenditures are annualized (by multiplying 
by 26). Standard aggregation levels are 9, 37, 150 and 488 commodity groups. The demographic data 
include variables on number of children below 7, 16, and 20 years of age. My variable “No. of 
Children in household” denotes number of children below 16 years of age. I truncate the data in order 
to minimize outlier influence. 
 
Statistics Norway may, given the authorization, link Consumer Expenditure Survey datasets with 
datasets from income registers. These income registers are not surveys, but complete and exhaustive 
full-count registers compiled by the Norwegian Tax Administration (Skattedirektoratet, the 
Norwegian equivalent of the IRS) and National Insurance Administration (Rikstrygdeverket). and 
contain records of all Norwegian residents. I was able to access several income variables in these 
merged datasets, e.g. income before taxes and income after taxes. So insofar as the reported data do 
not rely on individual memory or individual discretion, but are transmitted to the income registers 
directly by the employers, they maintain a very high standard.  
 
Table 1 tabulates some summary statistics for the data. 
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Table 1. Data1 characteristics. CES and income tax data. Norway. 2004-2006  
Variable N 10th Percentile Median Mean 90th Percentile 
2004      
Share of 
Imputed Rent2 882 0.0366 0.0679 0.0872 0.153 
Gross Income 1,097 251,266 563,153 588,275 955,812 
No. of Adults 1,097 1 2 2.10 3 
No. of 
Children 1,097 0 1 1.05 3 
2005      
Share of 
Imputed Rent 846 0.0526 0.0950 0.118 0.202 
Gross Income 1,049 240,840 576,392 616,115 1,022,257 
No. of Adults 1,049 1 2 2.11 3 
No. of 
Children 1,049 0 0 0.93 2 
2006      
Share of 
Imputed Rent 819 0.0612 0.108 0.126 0.207 
Gross Income 955 263,849 618,959 645,565 1,066,453 
No. of Adults 955 1 2 2.12 3 
No. of 
Children 955 0 0 0.96 3 
Notes: 1 Truncation at NOK 100,000 and 2,000,000. 2 Share of imputed rent is the ratio of imputed rent on gross 
income. 
4b. Imputed Rent and Owner-Occupier’s Housing Attributes 
For every CES survey household, an imputed rent is assigned on the basis of observable attributes of 
the household’s home. This is done by a special task force at Statistics Norway and is a pilot project, 
utilizing data from the rental survey described below (which the author participated in constructing). 
Given its novelty as a statistical project, there has only been time to build up three-year set of data. 
Moreover, there was a methodological break between the 2004-2005 methodology and the 2006-
methodology. The latter improved the former; the latest method is more sophisticated and the 
imputing-algorithm is superior in accuracy. This article uses only the 2006 cross-section in 
constructing the housing tax example.  
 
For the years 2004 and 2005, the sample was divided into strata of geographical location, size of 
home, and home type, giving 24 strata in all. Every household in a given stratum is assigned an 
imputed rent derived from the average rent retrieved by a rental survey. In 2006, the imputation 
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method included an algorithm that computes imputed rent as an explicit function of size and spatial 
residence. It was specifically designed to account for the non-linearity in imputed rent for different 
sizes. The parameters derive from estimates based on collected monthly rents in the Norwegian Rental 
Survey of 2006; see Røed Larsen and Sommervoll (2009) for the use of the first vintage of data from 
the Norwegian Rental Survey, 2005. 
 
As the population of rental objects in Norway is not known it is impossible to draw a simple random 
sample. There was a count of owner-occupied and rental objects in 2001, which attempted to map all 
housing objects and identify rental objects. The number of rental objects was estimated at 458,000, 
which is 23 percent of all housing objects. Rental frequencies, as measured as the ratio of rental 
objects on all housing objects, vary with region, so a weighted, stratified scheme underlies the 
sampling techniques. The resulting sampling scheme consists of several stages the first of which 
involves constructing an address list with ex ante properties, while the second and third involves 
drawing and contacting households. The Norwegian Rental Survey of 2006 assembled 28,000 
addresses in Norway, each of which was assigned an interview object (IO), i.e. a personal name 
(tenant or owner). This set was constructed on the basis of a main sample, based on a stratified 
sampling scheme, of 20,000 object addresses and a supplementary list of addresses of 8,000 persons 
age 20−29. The region including Norway’s capital, Oslo, was over-sampled in the main sample with 
about 2,000 addresses. These two sampling maneuvers were carried out to detail the rental market in 
Oslo and overcome non-responding tendencies of young people. 
 
Statistics Norway contacted the IO by mail and/or telephone. Non-responding IOs included 146 
persons who had died, 7,464 who lacked an identifiable telephone number, and 4,572 in the 
miscellaneous category.  The data acquisition field period covered February 27 – June 13 2006. 
Average mean interview length for tenants was 8 minutes and a highly-detailed list of attributes was 
collected. From the set of addresses, 15,818 interviews (postal and telephonic) were performed; of 
these 5,169 IOs were identified as tenants.  
 
There are differences in size and spatial attributes between rental objects and owner-occupied objects, 
but the differences are not completely documented. The Rental Survey is, to the best of my 
knowledge, unique in its range and detail. It documents physical attributes of the rental object, types of 
renting agreement, characteristics of tenant, landlord, and their interaction, length of rental period, and 
types of contract. 
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The 2006 algorithm for computing monthly imputed rent (MHR) for owner-occupiers was constructed 
by statisticians at Statistics Norway. It is based on the observed association between rent and attributes 
of the rental object in the Rental Survey. The algorithm is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The 2006-algorithm for computing monthly imputed rent 
Zone 1. Oslo: 
Size below 100 m2: MIR = 3329.11 + 59.57 * size 
Size at and above 100 m2: MIR = 5566.48 + 42.13 * size 
 
Zone 2. Akershus, Bergen, Trondheim, Stavanger, and Tromsø 
All sizes:  MIR = 3790.84 + 28.64 * size 
 
Zone 3. Cities and urban areas with population of more than 20 000 inhabitants (except 
households included in zone 1 and 2) 
All sizes:  MIR = 3070.98 + 24.66 * size 
 
Zone 4. Small towns and urban areas with population in interval 2 000 – 19 999 inhabitants 
All sizes:  MIR = 2907.79 + 17.60 * size 
 
Zone 5. Urban areas with population in interval 200 – 1999 inhabitants 
All sizes:  MIR = 2504.72 + 13.48 * size 
 
5.  Stage Four: Empirical Investigation of the Distribution of 
Imputed Rent 
Table 3 charts the results of a parametric regression of the share of imputed rent of gross income onto 
a space spanned by a second order polynomial of the logarithm of gross income with the two 
demographic shift variables: number of adults in the household and number of children in the 
household. I include a second regression model for the most recent year with “Age of the main income 
earner” as a third candidate for preference shifter. All results are robust to this inclusion. Since the 
2006 algorithm for imputed rent is more accurate than the predecessors, this is the only year I analyze. 
I do append however results from 2004 and 2005 in Table 3 for comparison purposes and sensitivity 
checks. We observe that the regression’s adjusted R-squared is 0.587, a high score in a cross-section 
with a size of 819. It could indicate an outlier influence, but my truncation scheme with cut-off points 
at NOK 100,000 and NOK 2,000,000 prevent the tail influencers. Table 1 tabulates the 10th and 90th 
percentile of the share of imputed rent in 2006 as 0.0612 and 0.207, which indicates a significant 
compression in the distribution of shares.  More likely, the high R-squared reflects partially the fact 
that imputed rent is a constructed variable, as described above. 
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Nevertheless, I interpret the high R-squared as at least indicative of preference homogeneity and good 
model fit. The estimated coefficient of log(gross income) is clearly negative, -2.28, and highly 
statistically significant with an absolute t-value of 16.3. It demonstrates that housing consumption, 
measured by imputed rent, is a necessity. The estimated Engel curve for imputed rent shows curvature 
since the estimated coefficient of squared log(gross income) is positive, 0.0821, and highly statistically 
significant. The number of adults affects the share of imputed rent more than the number of children 
since the former’s estimated coefficient is 0.00463 and the latter’s 0.00356. Although these estimates 
have the expected sign, absolute and relative magnitudes, they are not both statistically significant. 
The age of the main income earner does not affect results much, as can be seen in Table 3’s right-most 
column. The estimated coefficient is small and its t-value 0.45, making it far from statistically 
significant. In the appendix, I list the results of a regression with an alternative specification, a non-log 
polynomial, in Table A1 which supports the findings shown in Table 3. In summary, the parametric 
results demonstrate the homogeneity of households’ choice of housing, which indicates the potential 
imputed rent holds as an object for taxation. However, the downward sloping Engel curve also implies 
that a flat-rate housing tax would work regressively. 
 
Table 3.  Imputed1 rent’s share of gross income on a second order polynomial of logarithm of 
gross income, number of children2, number of adults, and age of main income earner 
(t-values). Norway. 2004-2006 
 Year 
 2004 2005 2006 2006 
Imputed Rent/Gross Income = a + b*Log(Gross Income) + c*Log(Gross Income) Squared + 
d*No. Children + e*No. Adults + f*Age of Main Income Earner + u 
N3 882 846 819 819 
Intercept 10.95 (21.5) 14.9 (23.7) 16.0 (17.3) 16.0 (17.2) 
Log(Gross 
Income) -1.56 (-20.1) -2.11 (-22.2) -2.29 (-16.3) -2.28 (-16.3) 
Log(Gross 
Income) 
Squared 
0.0559 (18.9) 0.0755 (20.8) 0.0821 (15.5) 0.0820 (-15.4) 
No. of Children -0.00122 (-1.3) -0.000727 (-0.6) 0.00356 (2.1) 0.00402 (2.02) 
No. of Adults -0.00382 (-2.3) -0.00151 (-0.7) 0.00463 (1.6) 0.00448 (1.56) 
Age of Main 
Income Earner Excluded Excluded Excluded 0.000080 (0.45) 
Adj R2 0.738 0.761 0.587 0.586 
Note: 1 Imputed rent methodology change in 2006. See the Data section for details. Truncation at NOK 100,000 
and 2,000,000 household gross income. Consumer Expenditure Surveys 2004-2006. 2 Children are defined as 
household members below 16 years of age. 3 N is the number of observations with positive imputed rent, i.e. 
homeowners. 
19 
Parametric results are highly useful since they allow data dimensionality to be reduced into a few 
interpretable parameters. The results, however, may suppress interesting empirical patterns, so to 
offset this likelihood I ran a non-parametric regression of the proportion of imputed rent onto gross 
income, see Table 3. Again, in this non-parametric regression type, I control for household type, 
composition, and size by segmentation. I divide the sample into different segments; Figure 1 shows 
the results for the type with 2 adults, with or without children of any age. I do not report results from 
other types, since they followed the same pattern, though I do show the results from the 1-adult type in 
Figure 2. 
 
Analysts could worry that the stage at which a household found itself in its life-cycle could be a 
confounder and that the declining Engel curve could be explained by the high housing consumption of 
young households relative to gross income and vice versa for the old households. This being the case, 
by carefully controlling for age, one would expect an Engel curve that declined less with gross 
income. In fact, age appears not to be a dominant preference shifter. The right-most column in Table 3 
demonstrates the non-statistical significance of the estimate of the age coefficient and Figures A1a and 
A1b in the Appendix show that when segmenting households into one population sub-segment 
consisting of households of 2 adults and 0 children where main income earner is above 50 and another 
where the households consist of 2 adults and 2 children, and the main income earner is between 35 and 
50, roughly uncovers the same Engel curve pattern. 
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Figure 1.  Non-parametric local regression of imputed rent’s share of gross income on gross 
income. Households of 2 adults (and zero, one, or several children). Non-deflated. 
Norway. 2004−2006 
 
Notes: Nominal Gross Income does not include imputed rent. I truncate all datasets by requiring gross income to 
be more than 100,000 NOK per household and less than 2,000,000 NOK per household. The non-parametric 
regression line for households of 2 adults and an unspecified number of children in the year 2004 included 579 
observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 347. 
Residual sum of squares: 0.584. Equivalent number of parameters: 4.12. The non-parametric regression line for 
households of 2 adults and an unspecified number of children in the year 2005 included 530 observations. It had 
17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 318. Residual sum of 
squares: 0.449. Equivalent number of parameters: 4.04. The non-parametric regression line for households of 2 
adults and an unspecified number of children in the year 2006 included 508 observations. It had 17 fitting points 
and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 304. Residual sum of squares: 1.33. 
Equivalent number of parameters: 4.03. 
 
Moreover, as we see from Figure 1, although functional form is always contentious in Engel curve 
studies, the non-parametric regressions demonstrate the ability of a parametric model consisting of 
second order log-polynomial to capture the essence of curvature. The impression of imputed rent 
being a necessary good is reinforced as the proportion of imputed rent clearly falls with gross income, 
although at a decreasing rate. 
 
There are at least two noteworthy findings to be drawn from Figure 1. First, notice the difference in 
the proportion of imputed rents for a given year. While households with low material standards of 
living may devote as much as 30 percent of gross income to housing, households with higher material 
standards of living may devote as little as 5 percent. Second, imputed rents show cyclicality. The 2004 
and 2005 methodologies were identical, yet the imputed rent shares for 2004 were considerably lower 
than those for 2005. Imputed rents can therefore be taken to reflect, it seems reasonable to assume, 
wider general economic conditions, including house values. In other words, the upward shift of the 
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imputed rent-share indicates that a tax on imputed rent would be relatively higher (lower) in relatively 
favorable (unfavorable) economic conditions. Such a tax would work counter-cyclically, if the rent 
imputation is done frequently. This is an important feature given recent declarations made by 
policymakers that they need a housing tax to stabilize the macroeconomic development.  
 
Figure 2 for smaller households of only one adult shows the same empirical regularity, albeit less 
pronounced for the shifts, but more dramatic for the difference in rent proportion between low and 
high material standards of living. The latter is consistent with the need for making housing taxes 
progressive in order to make them politically feasible. 
 
Figure 2.  Non-parametric local regression of imputed rent’s share of gross income on gross 
income. Households of 1 adult. Non-deflated. Norway. 2004−2006 
 
Notes: I truncate all datasets by requiring gross income to be more than 100,000 NOK per household and less 
than 2,000,000 NOK per household. The non-parametric regression line for singles in the year 2004 included 85 
observations. It had 14 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 51. 
Residual sum of squares: 0.208. Equivalent number of parameters: 4.03. The non-parametric regression line for 
singles in the year 2005 included 101 observations. It had 14 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 
0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 60. Residual sum of squares: 0.77. Equivalent number of parameters: 3.87. 
The non-parametric regression line for singles in the year 2006 included 89 observations. It had 17 fitting points 
and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 53. Residual sum of squares: 0.88. 
Equivalent number of parameters: 4.03. 
 
6. Stage Five: Construction of the Housing Taxation Scheme 
In the opinion of this article, a new tax scheme would not be feasible politically if it is regressive. 
Since many authors focus attention on the redistributive aspect of tax reform plans, it makes sense to 
inspect the actual progressivity of the Norwegian tax system. Figure 3 depicts how the tax (measured 
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as the difference between gross and net income, which includes transfers) proportion of gross income 
varies with gross income. As we can see, the non-parametric regression reveals strong progressivity. 
Low gross income households either pay little in tax, or they receive subsidies and transfers. High 
gross income households pay almost 40 percent in taxes in 2006. The tax share increases almost 
monotonically with gross income. A new tax would therefore not be viable in Norway if the most of 
the burden was shifted onto low-income households because it would violate and change existing 
progressivity. 
 
Figure 3.  Non-parametric local regression of total tax1 share of gross income on gross income. 
Households of 2 adults and an unspecified number of children. Non-deflated. Norway. 
2004−2006 
 
Notes: 1 I define tax as the difference between gross income and net income as reported by the tax register. I 
truncate all datasets by requiring gross income to be more than 100,000 NOK per household and less than 
2,000,000 NOK per household. I also require positive entries on the variable interest payment. The non-
parametric regression line for families of 2 adults and children in the year 2004 included 693 observations. It had 
17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 415. Residual sum of 
squares: 14.2. Equivalent number of parameters: 4.09. The non-parametric regression line for singles in the year 
2005 included 632 observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local 
neighborhood: 379. Residual sum of squares: 10.0. Equivalent number of parameters: 4.06. The non-parametric 
regression line for singles in the year 2006 included 578 observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing 
parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 346. Residual sum of squares: 5.52. Equivalent number of 
parameters: 4.02. 
 
This article suggests that a housing tax must fulfill at least four criteria in order to be politically 
feasible. 
1. A cut-off point for gross income must be introduced, below which no housing tax would be 
imposed.  
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The idea is to avoid the imposition of heavy levies on low income households which own valuable 
properties (which can happen when the property is inherited, for instance, or when owners have 
retired, relying partly on home equity as a pension scheme). These households could be forced to sell 
the house or take out a second mortgage simply to finance the housing tax if a cut-off point were not 
implemented. On the other hand it could be argued, not only income but wealth too should be taxed 
properly, and accrued tax for older people allowed to accumulate as an asset-backed liability with the 
house as security, postponing taxes indefinitely and collected post mortem before inheritance. 
2. The tax rate must be increasing in imputed rent, i.e. the rental-equivalent housing 
consumption.  
The idea is that as the value of housing consumption increases, so should the tax rate. The legitimacy 
of this attribute lies with public acceptance of progressive rates. 
3. The proportion of a housing tax out of gross income must be increasing in gross income; i.e. 
the housing tax must be progressive. 
Again, the attribute is considered a necessary condition for imposing new levies without public 
opposition. 
4. The housing tax cannot be large compared to income and labor income taxes.  
 
The idea is that the converse is not viable for implementing new taxes. A large levy would not be 
politically feasible and the public might not be convinced that it would substitute labor income taxes. 
A large housing tax could be seen as just another vehicle for imposing ever-growing taxes. 
 
Of these four conditions, the first and last may provoke the strongest objections and controversy. The 
ideas, however, are tentative and meant primarily to illuminate the five stages. In other words, they are 
working hypotheses of what characterizes feasible outcomes in the political process of implementing 
tax regimes. 
A simple housing tax scheme 
Let us inspect a scheme in which all four conditions are met. It consists of two elements. First, 
households with a gross income below NOK 400,000 pay no housing tax regardless of the rental-
equivalent consumption value estimated from imputed rent. Second, the housing tax levied upon the 
household based on imputed rent starts at 30 percent of all imputed rent above the value of NOK 
60,000. For values above NOK 70,000; 80,000; and 90,000 additional taxes would be levied at rates of 
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4 percent, 5 percent, and 6 percent so that the highest rate is 45 percent. This housing tax function is 
summarized in equation (8). 
(10) 
0%, when 60,000
Tax-rate, housing 30%, when 60,000
4%;5%;6%, when 70,000; 80,000; 90,000
≤
= > > > >
 
Figure 4 displays the features of such a housing tax scheme. First, no taxes are levied on low income 
households thanks to the cut-off point at NOK 400,000. Second, the housing tax rises with income. 
Third, the housing tax proportion increases with income. This is clearly a progressive tax, but it is not 
prohibitively large: indeed, it flattens out at around 1.2 percent of gross household income. 
 
Figure 4.  Non-parametric local regression of housing tax and housing tax share1 of gross 
income on gross income. Households of 2 adults (and zero, one, or several children). 
Truncation on gross income. Norway. 2006 
 
Note: 1 I truncate on gross income at the cut-off level of NOK 400,000, which reduces the observed number of 
households by 62 to 446 in this population segment. The earlier cut-off level at NOK 2 million is still applied. 
The non-parametric regression line for computed housing tax for families of 2 adults and children in the year 
2006 included 446 observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local 
neighborhood: 267. Residual sum of squares: 34610084910. Equivalent number of parameters: 3.98. The non-
parametric regression line for housing tax share for families with 2 adults and children in the year 2006 included 
446 observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 
267. Residual sum of squares: 0.0573. Equivalent number of parameters: 3.98. 
 
In this hypothetical exercise, 446 households would have paid NOK 2,845,792 in housing taxes, or 
NOK 6,381 per paying household. However, as 62 households are exempted from tax, the average tax 
per households in this segment is NOK 5,602. In Norway, there are about 2.1 million households, 
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regardless of type and segment.3 Thus, a crude ball-park estimate for the revenue generated by this 
scheme can be obtained by multiplying the amount of housing tax per household in the sample by the 
number of households in the population. This estimate is NOK 11.8 billion, which may appear 
relatively modest compared to a gross domestic product (GDP) of NOK 2,160 billion (NOK 1,581 
billion when excluding the value of off-shore oil extraction). The housing tax revenue would be just a 
little more than half a percent of GDP. 
7. Discussion 
Implementing a partial tax scheme on one good necessarily involves considering the effects on the 
existing tax system. This is true even if a tax on housing consumption allows separation without much 
leakage given that everybody must consume housing and an escape into rental markets can be made 
unprofitable (and taxed, for that matter). Policymakers may still seek to prevent owner-occupiers from 
establishing a firm to which they sell their house and rent it back as tenants in order to avoid the 
housing tax if the existing tax code made the option economically tempting despite the tax landlords 
pay on profits. This could be done by taxing tenants as well as owner-occupiers, but would require 
simultaneous changes in interest deductibility. Additionally, they might find that capital gains from 
house transactions would have to be taxed as other capital gains in countries where they are not. Thus, 
changing one part of the tax system may require changing other parts. This article does not analyze the 
effect of a full reform of the whole system, and attempting such an analysis would require a detailed 
presentation of the whole Norwegian tax system, which again would exhaust the space available for a 
single article. The article’s purpose is much narrower and specific; it aims to demonstrate what the 
stages of housing taxation are.  
 
One possible alternative to using imputed rent for estimating latent housing consumption expenditures 
would be to use estimated market house values. If a home rents for NOK 100,000 per year and sells 
for 2,000,000 per year both the rent and the market price allow estimation of latent housing 
consumption expenditures. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages. The latter may be 
preferable if the rental sector is small, specialized, or localized. In those situations, market rents will 
not always be available, or accurate, and out-of-sample predictions may be highly imprecise. 
However, estimating housing consumption from market values also comes with some challenges. 
First, market house prices appear more volatile than market rental values, so from a policymaker’s 
point of view, the tax revenues would vary. From a house owner’s point of view, the tax liability 
                                                     
3 International readers may find more relevant statistics in English online: 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/02/01/20/familie_en/ 
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would vary. This would negatively affect the implementability and sustainability of the new scheme. 
Also, to preserve public support for the tax system, or at least avoid public displeasure and social 
unrest, the tax would have to be computed from very recent value estimates. Such speed requirements 
would be a major practical challenge. Over the longer term, housing consumption computed from 
rents or market prices would be quite comparable in magnitude, since the P/E rate (the price divided 
by annual rents) in housing markets appears to be mean-reverting in the long run. However, the former 
method’s low volatility is a definite advantage for practical purposes and the latter stronger potency as 
a counter-cyclical stabilizer also counts as a clear benefit. 
 
Thalman (2007) suggests that market rent may not constitute an entirely appropriate basis for 
computation since rent may include some mark-up to take into account landlords’ tax payments. 
Policymakers should apply a housing income concept, the available income after housing costs by 
keeping track of e.g. production costs and capital gains, he suggests. His scheme is elaborate and 
involves close study of the consequences of renting or owning. There may not be much conflict 
between his resulting scheme and the one suggested here, however, as both end up using a type of 
imputed rent and the simplicity of this article’s system of a direct rate on imputed rent is a clear 
advantage. 
 
In fact, the alternatives to the method suggested in this article may require substantial datasets. The 
computed taxes from these alternatives could prove volatile, unpredictable, and non-transparent. For 
policymakers and Treasuries to have a chance of implementing housing taxes in countries where they 
do not exist, they must be aware of the difficulty of mounting a convincing argument explaining why 
an owner should be taxed at all. The rental-equivalence principle is convincing since it is simple and 
transparent. Most people realize that foregone rent is a real cost avoided which also reflects upon 
latent housing consumption expenditure. 
 
In terms of empirical estimation, several points can be made. For example, even though the 2SLS 
method was considered inappropriate for estimating parameters of housing demand since curvature 
would be of the essence, it would still be interesting to cross-check results with the ones obtained. 
Although these regressions were run and I do not discuss the results here, they are in line with the ones 
presented. Moreover, even though imputed rents do not exist for years prior to 2004, it would still be 
interesting to follow housing expenditures over a longer period and test the sensitivity of the scheme to 
different macroeconomic environments. Table A2 in the appendix presents summary statistics for 
housing for the period 2000−03 and a 2SLS regression of observable housing expenditures (main 
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category) onto endogenous total expenditure, number of adults, and number of children, with income 
variables as instruments. Table A3 reports a regression onto a second-order polynomial in gross 
income for years 2000−03 and Table A4 results from a pooled regression with an adjustment for 
inflation.  
 
As insurance payments are related to the value of the house and housing consumption is related to the 
value of the home, a proposal for a tax scheme based on insurance value would merit consideration. In 
contrast to interest payments, for example, insurance payments do not change with payments on 
principal and they are relatively insensitive to the business cycle (although the value of the house does 
vary pro-cyclically). Figure A2  shows the results of a non-parametric regression of the share of 
insurance premiums onto gross income. The curves are remarkably smooth across the income 
spectrum and very stable over time and, indeed, almost identical for the three cross-sections. However, 
the insurance value of a house is the rebuilding cost, which may not accurately reflect the value of the 
home since it could be of an impractical type or located at a low-value site. The latter is important 
since a key component of the value of a home is the value of its spatial coordinates. Housing 
consumption is more than the consumption of hedonic, physical house attributes, it also includes 
consumption of location and position. Households have a willingness to pay for proximity to urban 
centers and geographical amenities, and it is this willingness that may represent the immobile and 
immutable core of housing demand that makes it attractive for tax purposes. 
8. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
Housing is an attractive object for tax purposes since housing demand is universal,  quite immobile 
and relatively immutable. Demand is not very elastic, so efficiency losses may be smaller than for 
labor income taxes. In fact, it is possible to conceive of a new housing tax as one with triple dividends. 
First, it could enhance efficiency if it replaces labor income taxes that have large deadweight losses. 
Second, it could function as an automatic stabilizer since it would tend to work counter-cyclically. 
Third, it could be made to be quite redistributive. 
 
This article claims the latter as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for implementing a new tax 
scheme. If a new tax works regressively it would not pass into legislation because of political 
opposition. Thus, a simple scheme involving a flat tax rate on a proxy of housing consumption may be 
attractive in its simplicity, but would work regressively if housing is a necessary good. In other words, 
an empirical analysis of housing demand must precede policymaking. In fact, this article suggests that 
the implementation of new housing taxation or the amelioration of existing housing taxation can be 
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broken down into five core stages: identification; estimation and data acquisition; empirical 
investigation; and tax function construction. 
 
Moreover, estimating the demand for housing is non-trivial. One cannot use observed interest 
payments, observed housing expenditures, or home insurance payments. Using market house values 
may prove difficult. This article shows, however, that invoking the rental-equivalent principle 
facilitates the estimation of latent housing consumption expenditures by studying owner-occupiers’ 
foregone rent. Combining data on market rents and rental object attributes with data on owner-
occupiers’ housing attributes allows one to reverse-compute what owners forego in rent when they live 
in the home themselves. Inspecting these imputed rent estimates of latent housing consumption 
expenditures, I find that that housing is, indeed, a necessary good. The demand for housing is quite 
predictable and stable. In fact, a parametric regression of imputed rent’s share of gross income onto a 
second order polynomial in the logarithm of gross income, number of adults, and number of children 
reveals high explanatory power. I obtain an adjusted R-squared of 0.587. Even if this R-squared is 
artificially high in that imputed rent is a constructed variable, it is most likely still indicative of the 
explanatory power of the model. There is a clear and employable pattern between housing 
consumption and gross income. Non-parametric analysis supports the finding that the share of imputed 
rent is decreasing in gross income, with curvature. 
 
Some practitioners may find the actual content of my tax proposal to be somewhat impractical. They 
could be right. This article’s purpose is to demonstrate the plausibility of a procedure and explain 
stage-by-stage how to implement it, based on real households’ real behavior, rather than putting 
forward a policy directive. It remains to be seen, some would add, how inelastic the demand for 
housing is compared to labor supply. The efficiency gains might prove smaller over time than the 
literature anticipates if households engage in tax avoidance behavior on the scale of labor supply. 
After all, this article’s hypotheses are working hypotheses on consumer behavior. 
 
However, the clear empirical regularity observed in this article’s examination of how consumers 
behave allows us to construct a non-linear housing tax scheme that fulfills some conditions of what 
constitutes a politically feasible tax proposal. These conditions are working hypotheses and must be 
scrutinized, but employing them makes it possible to demonstrate that a housing tax put on imputed 
rent can be increasing in rents and increasing in gross income. Moreover, the housing tax share may 
also be increasing in gross income. My example would have generated an estimated NOK 11.8 billion 
in 2006. 
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The tax scheme presented here allows cuts of labor income tax leading to lower deadweight losses. 
And since imputed rents are pro-cyclical, a tax on imputed rents would work counter-cyclically and 
act as an automatic stabilizer. 
 
30 
References 
Aaron, H. (1970): Income Taxes and Housing, American Economic Review, 60: 5, pp. 789-806. 
 
Atkinson, A. B. and J. E. Stigliz (1976): The Design of Tax Structure: Direct versus Indirect Taxation, 
Journal of Public Economics, 6, pp. 55-75. 
 
Banks, J., R. W. Blundell, and A. Lewbel (1997): Quadratic Engel Curves and Consumer Demand, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, pp. 527-539. 
 
Blundell, R. W., M. Browning, and I. A. Crawford (2003): Nonparametric Engel Curves and Revealed 
Preference, Econometrica, 71, pp. 205-240. 
 
Bye, B. and T. Åvitsland (2003): The Welfare Effects of Housing Taxation in a Distorted Economy: A 
General Equilibrium Analysis, Economic Modelling, 20, pp. 895-921. 
 
Christiansen, V. (1984): Which Commodity Taxes Should Supplement the Income Tax? Journal of 
Public Economics, 24, pp. 195-220. 
 
Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1998): On Optimal Taxation of Housing, Journal of Urban Economics, 
43, pp. 315-335. 
 
Davis, M. A. and J. Heathcote (2005): Housing and the Business Cycle, International Economic 
Review, 46: 3, pp. 751-784. 
 
De Vries, P., J. de Haan, E. van der Wal, and G. Mariën (2009): A House Price Index Based on the 
SPAR Method,  forthcoming, Journal of Housing Economics. 
 
Gervais, M. (2002): Housing Taxation and Capital Accumulation, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
49, pp. 1461-1489. 
 
Hendershott, P. H. and M. White (2000): Taxing and Subsidizing Housing Investments, NBER 
Working Paper No. 7928. 
 
Jud, D. and D. Winkler (2002): The Dynamics of Metropolitan Housing Prices, Journal of Real Estate 
Research, 23: 1-2, pp. 29-45. 
 
Leamer, E. (2007): Housing Is the Business Cycle, NBER Working Paper No. 13428. 
 
Lewbel, A. (1998): Semiparametric Latent Variable Model Estimation with Endogenous or 
Mismeasured Regressors, Econometrica, 66, pp. 105-121. 
 
Leung, C. (2004): Macroeconomics and Housing: A Review of the Literature, Journal of Housing 
Economics, 13, pp. 249-267. 
 
Nakagami, Y. and A. M. Pereira (1996): Budgetary and Efficiency Effects of Housing Taxation in the 
United States, Journal of Urban Economics, 39, pp. 68-86. 
 
Okun, A. M. (1975): Equality and Efficiency, in the Big Tradeoff. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution. 
 
31 
Poterba, J. (1992): Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers, American Economic Review, 
82: 2, pp. 237-242. 
 
Røed Larsen, E. and D. E. Sommervoll (2009): The Impact on Rent from Tenant and Landlord 
Characteristics and Interaction, Regional Science and Urban Economics. 39, pp. 316-322. 
 
Slemrod, J. (1994): Fixing the Leak in Okun's Bucket. Optimal Progressivity when Avoidance Can Be 
Controlled, Journal of Public Economics, 55: 1, pp. 41-51. 
 
Slemrod, J. and W. Kopczuk (2002): The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income, Journal of Public 
Economics, 84: 1, pp. 91-112. 
 
Thalmann, P. (2007): Tenure-Neutral and Equitable Housing Taxation, Urban Studies, 44, pp. 275-
296. 
 
32 
Appendix 
 
Table A1. Imputed1 rent’s share of gross income on a second order polynomial of gross income, 
number of children2, and number of adults (t-values). Norway. 2004-2006 
 Year 
 2004 2005 2006 
Model 1: Imputed Rent/Gross Income = a + b*(Gross Income) + c*(Gross Income) Squared + d* 
No. Children + e* No. Adults + u 
N3 882 846 819 
Intercept 0.273 (46.7) 0.363 (45.2) 0.343 (34.8) 
Gross Income -4.093E-7 (-24.9) -5.27E-7 (-23.4) -4.88E-7 (-18.2) 
Gross Income 
Squared 1.804E-13 (18.5) 2.20 E-13 (17.8) 2.05E-13 (14.0) 
No. of Children -0.00197 (-1.7) -0.00183 (-1.1) 0.00105 (0.5) 
No. of Adults -0.00623 (-3.1) -0.00744 (-2.6) -0.000705 (-0.2) 
Adj R2 0.605 0.597 0.444 
Note: 1 Imputed rent methodology change in 2006. See the Data section for details. Truncation at NOK 100,000 
and 2,000,000 household gross income. Consumer Expenditure Surveys 2004-2006. 2 Children are defined as 
household members below 16 years of age. 3 N is the number of observations with positive imputed rent, i.e. 
homeowners. 
 
Table A2. Manifest housing expenditure on manifest total expenditure, number of children, and 
number of adults (t-values). Broad housing measure*. Norway. 2000-2003 
 Year 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Model 1**: Housing expenditure = a + b*Total Expenditure + c* No. Children + d* No. Adults + u 
N 1052 989 1035 1076 
Mean Housing 72 094 74 531 85 503 86 349 
Mean Total 
Expenditure 346 351 355 630 368 580 381 917 
Intercept 28704 (3.9) 24771 (3.9) 8848 (1.1) 17580 (2.5) 
Total 
Expenditure 0.120 (4.1) 0.190 (8.9) 0.266 (8.2) 0.237 (8.0) 
No. of Children 5684 (2.7) 4115 (2.5) 1764 (0.8) 660 (0.3) 
No. of Adults -1939 (-0.7) -10725 (-3.8) -10918 (-2.9) -10408 (-2.7) 
Adj R2 0.0661 0.116 0.116 0.119 
Note: Consumer Expenditure Surveys 2000−03. Truncation by total expenditure at levels NOK 100,000 and 
2,000,000. The former led to deletion of 249 observations; the latter of 2 observations. 4,152 observations in 
dataset for 2000−03. * K3 is expenditure category 3 (out of 9). It includes housing maintenance, electricity, 
water etc. ** Two-stage-least-square set-up. Gross and net income are instruments for endogenous total 
expenditure. 
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Table A3. Housing expenditures’ share of gross income on a gross income polynomial, number 
of children, and number of adults (t-values). Broad housing measure*. Norway. 2000-
2003 
 Year 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Model 2**: Housing expenditure/Gross Income = a + b*Gross Income + c*Gross Income Squared + 
d* No. Children + e* No. Adults + u 
N 1097 1022 1067 1097 
Mean Housing 69 487 71 572 81 949 84 333 
Mean Gross 
Income 508 639 510 739 547 967 582 897 
Intercept 0.294 (16.4) 0.310 (17.6) 0.311 (15.7) 0.308 (21.1) 
Gross Income -4.258E-7 (-7.5) -4.683E-7 (-7.6) -4.366E-7 (-6.8) -4.508E-7 (-9.9) 
Gross Income 
Squared 1.717E-13 (5.1) 2.323E-13 (5.3) 1.907E-13 (4.6) 2.059E-13 (7.3) 
No. of Children 0.0233 (5.6) 0.0235 (6.1) 0.0297 (7.1) 0.0248 (8.2) 
No. of Adults 0.000527 (0.07) -0.00464 (-0.7) -0.000932 (-0.1) 0.00287 (0.5) 
Adj R2 0.107 0.129 0.118  
Note: Consumer Expenditure Surveys 2000−03. Truncation by gross income at gross income levels NOK 
100,000 and 2,000,000.  The former entail a loss of 86 observations; the latter 34 observations. 4,283 
observations in dataset for 2000−03. 
 
Table A4. Housing expenditures’ share of gross income on a real gross income polynomial, 
number of children, number of adults, and a deflated category 3 index (t-values). 
Broad housing measure*. Norway. 2000-2003 
 2000-2003 
Model 2**: Housing expenditure/Gross Income = a + b*Real Gross Income + c*Real Gross 
Income Squared + d* No. Children + e* No. Adults + f*(Category 3 Index/CPI) + u 
N 4,283 
Intercept 0.206 (4.5) 
Real Gross Income -4.472E-7 (-15.3) 
Real Gross Income Squared 2.038E-13 (10.6) 
No. of Children 0.0252 (13.2) 
No. of Adults -0.00095 (-0.3) 
Category 3 Index/CPI 0.0912 (2.1) 
Adj R2 0.127 
Note: Consumer Expenditure Surveys 2000−03. Truncation by gross income at gross income levels NOK 
100,000 and 2,000,000.  The former entail a loss of 86 observations; the latter 34 observations. 4,283 
observations in dataset for 2000−03. Category 3 Index is not a house price index. It is the sub-index in the CPI 
associated with the category K3 Housing Expenditures, Electricity, Heating 
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Figure A1a. Non-parametric local regression of rent’s share of gross income on gross income. 
Households of 2 adults and no children. Main income earner above 50 years of age. 
Norway. 2006 
Non-parametric local regression of imputed rent's 
share. 2 adults, 0 children, above 50 years.
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Notes: Nominal Gross Income does not include imputed rent. I truncate all datasets by requiring gross income to 
be more than 100,000 NOK per household and less than 2,000,000 NOK per household. The non-parametric 
regression line for households of 2 adults and no children in the year 2006 where main income earner was above 
50 years of age included 179 observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points 
in local neighborhood: 107. Residual sum of squares: 0.787. Equivalent number of parameters: 4.03 
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Figure A1b.  Non-parametric local regression of rent’s share of gross income on gross income. 
Households of 2 adults and 2 children. Main income earner between 35 and 50 
years of age. Norway. 2006 
Non-parametric local regression of imputed rent's 
share. 2 adults, 2 children, between 35 and 50 years.
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Notes: Nominal Gross Income does not include imputed rent. I truncate all datasets by requiring gross income to 
be more than 100,000 NOK per household and less than 2,000,000 NOK per household. The non-parametric 
regression line for households of 2 adults and 2 children in the year 2006 where main income earner was 
between 35 and 50 years of age included 103 observations. It had 16 fitting points and the smoothing parameter 
was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 61. Residual sum of squares: 0.0973. Equivalent number of parameters: 
4.15 
 
36 
Figure A2.  Non-parametric local regression of proportion of housing1 insurance expenditures 
on gross income. Households of 2 adults and an unspecified number of children. 
Non-deflated. Norway. 2004-2006 
 
Notes: 1 I truncate on positive expenditures on housing insurance. I also truncate all datasets by requiring gross 
income to be more than 100,000 NOK per household and less than 2,000,000 NOK per household. I also require 
positive entries on the variable interest payment. The non-parametric regression line for families of 2 adults and 
children in the year 2004 included 503 observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 
0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 301. Residual sum of squares: 0.0065. Equivalent number of parameters: 
4.14. The non-parametric regression line for singles in the year 2005 included 418 observations. It had 17 fitting 
points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local neighborhood: 250. Residual sum of squares: 
0.0083. Equivalent number of parameters: 3.98. The non-parametric regression line for singles in the year 2006 
included 385 observations. It had 17 fitting points and the smoothing parameter was 0.60. Points in local 
neighborhood: 231. Residual sum of squares: 0.0074. Equivalent number of parameters: 4.08 
 
